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Biomedical Patenting: Permitted, But Permissible?
Cyril R. Vidergarf
I. INTRODUCTION
Public and political concerns over stem cell research have
simmered in the United States for more than a decade. In the face of
President George W. Bush's support of a ban on genetic tissue
cloning for all purposes, the U.S. Senate refused to adopt a measure in
December 2001 that would have imposed a restriction on cloning
technology.' Connected with stem cell research, cloning has become
an alternative method of producing research material. This link has
abridged progress in cloning, along with stem cell research under
restrictions recently created by the president, limiting federal funding
of research to work that uses a narrow field of cellular material.
Cloning and stem cell research have also, perhaps more significantly,
been hedged by the effects of patent law in relation to patents existing
at the time of Bush's August 9, 2001 stem cell pronouncement.2 The
Senate's December 2001 decision underscores the unresolved debate
over patenting of biomedical and human material as it effects the
practical advancement of science and research in the field of
biomedicine.
t Cyril Vidergar is a third year law student in Santa Clara University's High
Technology Law program and a Senior Production Editor of the Santa Clara Computer and High
Technology Law Journal. He has clerked in the German Patent and Trademark Court and has
previously published articles on cloning legislation and medical care distribution systems. Cyril
would like to thank Dr. Bruce Beckord, M.D., Brad Levang, Janice Mueller, Maki Kanayama,
and Kiriko Urano for their inspiration and assistance in the research and editing of this
Comment.
1. Human Cloning Prevention Act of 2001, H.R. 3495, 107th Cong. § 2(a) (2001). The
Act prohibits payments to anyone that has or is affiliated with anyone that has engaged in
human cloning within the past year.
2. Address to the Nation on Stem Cell Research From Crawford, Texas, 37 PUB. PAPERS
32 (Aug. 13, 2001).
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Pluripotent cells, or stem cells, 3 have the potential of stimulating
regeneration of human cells once the stem cells have been implanted
in a patient. For example, with the aid of stem cells, a diabetic's own
system could produce functioning insulin-generating pancreatic cells
and replace the non-functioning, disease-causing tissue. Though
pancreatic cells are the most flexible human cells and currently
represent great hope for curing innumerable physiological
impairments, they exist in their most undifferentiated form only in
early embryonic tissue. To a lesser degree, a form of these pancreatic
cells are also found in adults,4 but the greatest potential for stem cell
therapy arises from the use of the embryonic variety (hESC). 5
Prior to the appearance of the nerve streak, which later becomes
the spinal cord, a human blastocyst (pre-embryo) is comprised mostly
of stem cells. These cells respond to chemical instructions to
differentiate into skin, neural, blood, and other types of cells that
construct the human body. This ability to "flip,, 6 has led researchers
to believe that these cells may enable the regeneration of damaged
adult tissue in every major organ and system.
A muddled public perception of procreative privacy and stem
cell research has led the current Administration to choose a
nonjusticable mechanism 7  to control the science rather than
collaborating on devising appropriate legislation. The current policy
3. See NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, STEM CELLS: SCIENTIFIC PROGRESS AND
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS (2001).
4. Id. at ES-6.
5. Human Embryonic Stem cells (hESC) are considered by many stem cell researchers
to be the easiest to manipulate of all stem cell varieties.(This needs a citation in support) As the
name suggests, they are extracted from human embryos before they have differentiated into
specific cell-types. They are believed to be the truly "blank slates" of the human organism. For
many years, women in the Unites States were permitted to donate tissue from their stillborn or
aborted fetuses but embryos were never grown specifically for harvesting hESC. Some
European nations, however, have considered more seriously establishing a fetal tissue/hESC
bank harvested through embryos grown in vitro specifically for that purpose. Michael Smith,
Canadians Seek Middle Ground on Stem Cells, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, May 23, 2002.
6. See Cloning's New Image; Researchers and Advocates Turn Lobbyists, SEATTLE
TIMES, June 19, 2002, at A3. "Flipping" is a cell's ability to become any other type of cell in
the body. Id.
7. "Nonjusticiable" refers to the category of political questions arising from
governmental policy-making. Such questions include the scope of the U.S. President's official
duties and his conduct in office. The U.S. Supreme Court has deemed these political questions
beyond its jurisdiction. The normal check on these political questions lies in the impeachment
process and the manner in which the American public chooses to cast its votes, rather than in the
courts. See generally Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996 (1979) and Nixon v. United States, 506
U.S. 224 (1993), (discussing "nonjusticiability" in various context and outlining the Supreme
Court's rationale for its involvement in politics).
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limit on research funding should not be tolerated in light of the dire
legal and social frustrations it is poised to cause. A more moderate
response geared toward channeling this research is required, and
should be done through the legislative process following objective
congressional consideration of the science and its repercussions on
world healthcare. In addition to the removal of the executive order,
attention also should be given to amend the application of the Patent
Code in the field of biomedicine so that it properly fosters the creative
incentives advanced in the Constitution.
This Comment begins by detailing the current state of the
biotechnology and patent law at the time of President George W.
Bush's pronouncement and the trickle-down effects of frustration
created by the combination of political and legal forces. Part III
analyzes potential flaws in allowing the patenting of biomedical and
human materials. Part IV proposes remedial acts available to
Congress and the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO or
PTO). Finally, Parts V and VI examine the future of patenting human
materials and the impact of U.S. government's funding limits on
public and private domestic researchers and the American people.
II. WHY THE USPTO ACCEPTED THE PATENTABILITY OF
BIOMEDICAL MATERIAL
Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants
legislative permission to enact a code that provides incentives to be
inventive. 8 The current U.S. Patent Act, as amended, is codified in
Title 35 of the United States Code. Title 35 requires any patent
application for a device, process, or method of operation to fulfill
three concepts before a patent is granted: novelty (not previously
envisioned), 9 utility (commercially useful), 10 and nonobviousness (not
apparent to one skilled in that field by looking at prior inventions). 11
8. Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts,
by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective
Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
9. See 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002): Conditions for patentability, novelty and loss of right to
patent:
A person shall be entitled to a patent unless (a) the invention was known or used
by others in this country, or patented or described in a printed publication in this
or a foreign country, before the invention thereof by the applicant for patent, or
(b) the invention was patented or described in a printed publication in this or a
foreign country or in public use or on sale in this country, more than one year
prior to the date of the application for patent in the United States, or (c) he has
abandoned the invention, or... (f) he did not himself invent the subject matter
sought to be patented, or (g) before the applicant's invention thereof the
2002]
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A. Statutory and Legal Foundations behind the Patent Code
Section 101 of the Patent Act grants a patent to anyone who
"invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful
improvement thereof,. . . subject to the conditions and requirements
of this title."'12  Although currently biological materials are patented
under the "composition of matter" category of §101,13 the basis for
permitting biological material patents is based on a problematic
concept. A biological material should not be considered to be new,
novel or non-obvious if it is extracted from an organism. Thus, a
patent would not be granted for such biological material.
Biomedical materials and the products of biotechnology
throughout most of the last century were excluded as non-patentable
by judicial doctrine. 14  Courts refused to allow these materials to be
classified as "compositions of matter" because they were considered
unpatentable "products of nature."' 5 The products of nature doctrine
prohibited the issuance of patents for discoveries that did not require
invention,' 6 thus excluding patent rights for discoveries of living
matter. This doctrine successfully eschewed the patenting of living
invention was made in this country by another who had not abandoned,
suppressed, or concealed it. In determining priority of invention there shall be
considered not only the respective dates of conception and reduction to practice
of the invention, but also the reasonable diligence of one who was first to
conceive and last to reduce to practice, from a time prior to conception by the
other.
10. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002).
11. See David G. Scalise & Daniel Nugent, International Intellectual Property
Protections for Living Matter: Biotechnology, Multinational Conventions and the Exception for
Agriculture, 27 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 83, 89 (1995). Nonobviousness is discussed in § 103:
A patent may not be obtained though the invention is not identically disclosed or described as
set forth in § 102 of this title, if the differences between the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time
the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (2002).
12. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2002), (Inventions patentable).
13. Id., e.g., Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain
a patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title [35 USCS §§ 1 et seq.]
(emphasis added).
14. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 11, at 89-90.
15. Id. at 90-91.
16. See id. at 90. An example where certain criteria are met, but others are not would be if
you discover a new plant variety, then realize it has a medicinal application in its natural form.
Though you would not be able to secure a patent for that medicinal application, your discovery,
nevertheless, meets both the new and useful criteria. What is missing is a modicum of human
intervention or an element of invention. Id.
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matter until 1980, when the Supreme Court overturned the doctrine in
Diamond v. Chakrabarty.'
7
B. Background and Decision of the Chakrabarty Case
The Chakrabarty case addressed the patentablity of a bacterium
strain with the ability to break down multiple components of crude oil
into environmentally absorbable elements. Ananada M. Chakrabarty
genetically engineered the bacterium to exhibit oil-consuming
characteristic. When the PTO rejected his claim for the bacteria
themselves, he contended that this trait was not readily seen in
bacteria found in naturally occurring strains.' 8 The PTO justified its
decision by stating that microorganisms are products of nature and, as
living things, they are per se non-patentable under § 101.19
Chakrabarty appealed the decision to the U.S. Court of Customs
and Patent Appeals, which reversed the PTO Board of Appeals
decision. It held that microorganisms are alive, and thus are without
legal significance for purposes of the patent law.20 On certiorari, the
Supreme Court asserted that Chakrabarty's bacteria were non-
naturally occurring manufacture or composition of matter and a
product of human ingenuity "having a distinctive name, character and
use."
21
The Supreme Court stated that genetic technology was not
within the conception of science with the enactment of § 101, because
that section did not preclude microorganisms from qualifying as a
patentable subject matter. The Court concluded, however, that
Congress was not required to emphatically state whether such
patentability existed before Chakrabarty would be allowed his patent.
The majority believed that Chakrabarty's "invention" came within the
17. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980).
18. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 305.
19. See id at 306.
20. See generally In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952 (1979). Appellants (Bergy, Coats, Malik, and
Chakrabarty) sought review of the decisions of the PTO Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences that affirmed the PTO's rejection of their product patent claims on the basis that
living organisms were not covered as patentable subject-matter under the "manufacture" or
"composition of matter" categories of § 101. The first patent involved a novel process for
preparing the antibiotic lincomycin by using a previously unknown microorganism in a
biologically pure culture. The second patent involved the invention of a new genetically
engineered strain of bacteria for the more effective degradation of oil spills. On both these
patents, process claims were allowed, but patenting of the microorganisms themselves was
rejected. The court reversed, holding that the appealed claims clearly defined subject matter that
Congress contemplated would be covered within the categories of § 101.
21. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 308-10; cf Hartranft v. Weigmann, 121 U.S. 609, 615
(1887); Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948).
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boundaries of § 101. Also, the Court clearly stated that the Court's
duty was to interpret Congress's intent in the statute and left the
amendment of §101 to Congress. 2  On the other hand, Justice
Brennan and his fellow dissenters went further and asserted that the
Court should leave to Congress the decision of whether and how far
to extend patent privilege into areas where common understanding
held patents were not available.23 Even the majority in Chakrabarty
stated that the popular conception at the time, even among advocates
of agriculture patents, was that living organisms were not
24 fr ''patentable. Before Chakrabarty, Congress had attempted to draft
patent protection for living matter several times, resulting in the Plant
Patent Acts.25 The dissent relied on this Act and the language limiting
protection to only certain discoveries. 26  Because Congress had not
defined patentable subject matter in §101 to include bacteria, the
dissent contended a patent should not be issued for the discovery of
bacteria.2 7
C. Chakrabarty Legacy
Proponents of biological matter patenting were quick to claim
that patenting any living matter was now acceptable under
Chakrabarty. On the other hand, opponents to such patenting
successfully prevailed in holding off animal patents by advancing the
Plant Patent Act of 193028 and Plant Variety Protection Act of 1970
("Plant Patent Acts"). 29  They asserted that through these acts,
22. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 314-18.
23. Id. at 319-22. See also Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp., 406 U.S. 518, 530-
31 (1972), wherein the Chakrabarty dissent believed that the policy of extending the patent laws
as a prophylactic measure to reconcile the Nation's deep-seated antipathy to monopolies with
the need to encourage progress.
24. See Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. at 319 n.l, for Brennan, White, Marshall, and Powell's
dissent citing to 311-12, and n.8 of majority decision.
25. See id.
26. Id. at 319-22.
27. Id.
28. Plant Patent Act of 1930, 71 Pub. L. No. 245, 46 Stat. 376 (1930) (codified as
amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 161-164 (2002)). The Act states that "[a]ny person... who has
invented or discovered and asexually reproduced any distinct and new variety of plant...
may... obtain a patent." Id. at 376 § 4886. (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 161 (2002)).
The Plant Patent Act was passed so that agriculture could reap the benefits of the patent system
as well as the industry. Cf Scalise & Nugent, supra note 11, at 91.
29. Plant Variety Protection Act, 91 Pub. L. No. 577, 84 Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321-2582 (1994 & Supp. 11 1996)). The Plant Variety Protection Act
extended patent protection to some sexually reproduced plants, provided they satisfy the
requirement that they differ in some way from all prior varieties. See id. at 1547 (codified as
amended at 7 U.S.C. § 2402 (1994 & Supp. 1996)). This act also gave an important exemption
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Congress defined the boundaries of living matter patents.3 ° They
argued that animal patents fell beyond the defined range stated in
these legislative policies and thus were not clearly granted
patentability, even under the Chakrabarty decision. The patentability
of human matter, as well rises or falls with the patentability of animal
matter; if the latter is impermissible, so too is the former.
Few animals (single or multi-celled) had yet come before the
patent system, thus a conservative reading of Chakrabarty may have
been fair in 1980.31 Congress had specifically extended the definition
of patentable subject matter in the Plant Patent Acts, but as the
Chakrabarty dissent reinforced, Congress implicitly disapproved
extending protection into areas not elaborated upon in the Acts.32
Inevitably, Chakrabarty set the stage for legitimizing life form
patents. Though it did not result in patents for all living matters,
Chakrabarty lead the PTO to amend its requirements following Ex
parte Allen in 1987. 33
Ex parte Allen was the first case to test the Chakrabarty decision
with complex, multi-cellular animals.34 The suit challenged the
PTO's rejection of an application to patent a genetically engineered
oyster. The PTO rationalized its decision based on the natural
occurrence and obviousness of oysters.35 On appeal, the Board of
Patent Appeals and Inferences did not entirely overturn the PTO
position on obviousness, but it did dispense with the "naturally-
occurring" component.36 The Board left open the determination of
whether living organisms would be patentable.37  Immediately
from the patent protections: researchers and farmers were allowed to reproduce the plants
naturally without paying royalties. Cf Scalise & Nugent, supra note 11, at 94-95.
30. See Scalise & Nugent, supra note 11, at 95.
31. At the time of the Chakrabarty decision, most legislation embracing animal research
dealt with how to protect them from cruelty (e.g., NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH,
GUIDELINES FOR RESEARCH INVOLVING RECOMBINANT DNA MOLECULES, 45 FR 77384
(1980)). There was a dearth of legislation specifically addressing discoveries in animal science,
setting them apart from the "products of nature" doctrine in a way comparable to discoveries in
plant science. See Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127 (1948), for the
proposition that patent protection for natural products may still be denied in the face of the
Chakrabarty decision.
32. See Chakrabarty, 4447 U.S. at 319 n. L
33. Animals Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. U.S.P.T.O. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987).
34. Exparte Allen, 2 U.S.P.Q. 2d (BNA) 1425 (P.T.O. Bd. App. & Int. 1987).
35. Id. at 1426. Nonobviousness was grounded in the presence of prior art that disclosed
the methods of polyploiding other species of oysters to create varieties.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 1427.
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following that decision, the PTO issued an official statement
embracing the policy for which Exparte Allen stood:
The Patent and Trademark Office now considers non-naturally
occurring non-human multi-cellular living organisms, including
animals, to be patentable subject matter within the scope of 35
U.S.C. [§] 101.
The Board's decision does not affect the principles and practices
that products found in nature will not be considered to be
patentable... An article of manufacture or composition of matter
occurring in nature will not be considered patentable unless given a
new form, quality, properties or combination not present in the
original article... A claim directed to or including within its scope
a human being will not be considered to be patentable. 38
The PTO's announcement did not result in a clear line that
"anything under the sun" would be patentable under §§ 101 and 102.
In April 1988, the PTO dealt with the issue again when it issued the
Harvard Mouse patent. 39 The PTO's tentative grant of animal patents
has progressed slowly, and patent applications claiming human
biomedical material have taken the "animal patent" concept to a new
level by asserting use of human embryonic tissue. Including animal
matter as patentable subject logically results in categorizing humans
in the animal species, thus, human matter should also be patentable.
Once human matter is decided to be patentable, the PTO would face
the question of to what extent should manipulated human tissue be
patentable.
III. INADEQUACY OF CURRENT PATENT SCHEMES IN BIOMEDICAL
CONTEXTS
A. Inherent Weakness in Current Domestic Expansion of Patent
Law
Under the Patent Act (Title 35) applicants must satisfy five
requirements to have their patent issued. They must demonstrate
appropriate subject matter, utility, novelty, nonobviousness, and
adequate disclosure. 40 However, in the context of biomedical and
38. Animals Patentability, 1077 Off. Gaz. U.S.P.T.O. 24 (Apr. 21, 1987) (emphasis
added), reprinted in DONALD S. CHISUM, 9 CHISUM ON PATENTS, app. 24-2 (2d ed.
2001)[hereinafter CHISUM ON PATENTS].
39. E.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866 (issued Apr. 12, 1988).
40. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 101-103 (2002).
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human matter patents the PTO appears to not recognize these
requirements in some cases.
1. Inadequate Subject Matter Limits
Currently, human cell lines, some composed entirely of naturally
occurring human tissue at the gene level, have been granted patents.
The PTO has also issued patents for microorganisms and animal cell
lines, which combine animal and human genes, and multi-cellular
transgenic animals with genes similar or exhibiting characteristics
similar to those of the human genes. Granting patents for the human-
animal chimeras appear to permit expansion of patentability beyond
the PTO's April 7, 1987 statement following Ex parte Allen. Human-
based multi-cellular organisms are arguably being patented primarily
due to a lack of clear distinction in the Patent Code regarding how
much human matter is too much, as well as a general lack of
challenge to these applications on the basic level of patentability.41
2. Utility Requirement that Ignores Morality
The utility requirement in § 101 has also led to dispute in
biomedicine patents.42  With technological advances comes
modernization of legal theory, and as biotechnology appeared as an
industry, the Supreme Court began to narrow the interpretation of
utility. In 1966, the Court decided Brenner v. Manson, which
modified the tenet to require an invention to show a more immediate
and "specific utility. ' , 3 This progress toward a clearer legal scrutiny
was aborted though, when genetic research quickened in the 1980's
and a more lenient standard emerged. For the most part, there was
regression to the pre-Brenner standard of not requiring utility per se
but only that "the product is not alleged to be detrimental to the public
interest.,
44
Over a decade passed before the PTO realized that this was an
untenable situation and amended its policy guidelines on utility.45 In
1995, the new guidelines specified that an application would be
rejected on utility grounds only if "it is not apparent why the applicant
41. Animals Patentability, supra note 38.
42. See Andrew T. Knight, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility
Guidelines in Light of Brenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1010 (1998).
43. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 535 (1966).
44. Knight, supra note 42, at 1011 (quoting Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018, 1019
(C.C.D. Mass. 1817 (No. 8,568)).
45. PTO Examination Guidelines on Utility [hereinafter Utility Guidelines], 50 PAT.
TRADEMARK & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA) 295, 295 (1995).
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believes the invention to be useful, '46 or "where an assertion of
specific utility for the invention made by the applicant is not
credible., 47 The prima facie conditions also appear to be met merely
upon a suggestion of utility if there is a commercially marketable
product behind the "invention." The burden of disproving utility then
effectively shifts to the PTO,48 when it is actually the applicant who
should be proving conclusively that he or she deserves the monopoly.
As a result, the applicant's competitors are prevented from developing
similarly applicable devices when only a scintilla of utility is required
to be shown.
Occasionally, the PTO has used the morality doctrine to decide
whether to grant a biomedical patent.49 The doctrine emerged in
Justice Storey's 1817 opinion in Lowell v. Lewis. 50 It read into the
Patent Act that the term "useful" was included to juxtapose
mischievous or immoral inventions, thus the requirement tied to
morality.5 ' Past courts have applied the doctrine to balance potential
beneficial and immoral applications for an invention. For example,
patents for gaming machines were blocked early in the 20th century
under the doctrine, 52 while handgun patents were permitted, as
overriding the inherent risks to public safety and moral standards.
53
Courts are reluctant to apply the doctrine today because cultural
norms and social mores change, but patent law should provide clear
predictable guidelines that do not waver with the whim of the popular
social tendency. Title 35 also does not require moral balancing, thus
morality alone is not likely to be a sole basis for rejecting a patent's
utility.
3. Relativity in Obviousness
The advancement of technology and science has revealed that
the requirement of obviousness is not clear at all, especially in
biomedicine. The policy of rejecting a claim, asserting that one
skilled in that field would find it "obvious to try with a reasonable
46. Id. at 297.
47. Id. at 298.
48. U.S. Patent and Trademark Office Media Advisory, No. 98-6, Facts on Patenting Life
Forms Having a Relationship to Humans (April 1, 1998), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/com/speeches/98-06.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2002).
49. Id.
50. See generally Lowell v. Lewis, 15 F. Cas. 1018 (C.C.D. Mass 1817).
51. Id.
52. See, e.g., Meyer v. Buckley Mfg. Co., 15 F. Supp. 640 (N.D. Ill. 1936).
53. See Fuller v. Berger, 120 F. 274, 275 (7th Cir. 1903).
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expectation of success, '54 does not work anymore. Once one stem
cell has been grown using a cancer gene or an animal cell, should that
process and the product thereof become obvious? Yet there are more
than a dozen stem cell patents claiming the nearly identical processes
for growing stem cells or using cells from mice or chimpanzees.5
Congress and former President Clinton recognized this
shortcoming in 1995 and sought to ameliorate the problem by
enacting the Biotechnology Process Patent Act.56 The Act amended
the utility requirement under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in two ways. First, it
added subsection (b) specifying that a biological process patent would
only be deemed nonobvious if it uses or results in a composition of
matter that is new and nonobvious 5 7 Second, the Act narrowed the
scope of what qualified as biotechnology. The field was to
encompass only: a) genetic alterations of an organism; b) cell fusion
resulting in cell lines; or c) use of products created by processes
defined by either a) or b). 8 The statutes support patenting the use of
human-genetic material through traditional medical research methods,
as long as the end result is new. At the same time, however, the
statute prohibits introducing a hybrid of human-animal genetic
material into humans because of obviousness.
4. The Novelty Circle
For biomedical patents, 35 U.S.C. § 102 sets a relatively low
requirement. It requires nothing more than that an invention is "not
anticipated in a single reference of prior art." 59 This means that no
one is able to point to a single prior invention or publication that also
disclosed all the elements claimed by the pending patent application.6°
Chakrabarty gave this requirement life in the context of living
material, injecting the idea that a modicum of human intervention
would suffice to show that the resulting organism is the "product of
human ingenuity. ' '6  The result is that little is made of novelty in
biomedical patenting unless the disputed human composition has
54. In re O'Farrell, 853 F.2d 894, 901-04 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
55. See U.S. Patent Nos. 6,423,829 (issued); 6,423,827 (issued); 6,423,824 (issued);
6,423,682 (issued); 6,423,526 ; and 6,423,494; cf U.S. Patent Nos. 6,419,920; 6,419,942;
6,399,061; 6,384,194; 6,376,236; and 6,361,948.
56. See Biotechnology Process Patent Act, 104 Pub. L. No. 41, 109 Stat. 351 (1995).
57. See generally 35 U.S.C. § 103(b) (2002).
58. 35 U.S.C. § 103 (b)(3) (2002).
59. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2002);
60. See id.; see also CHISUM ON PATENTS, supra note 38, at 3-6.
61. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
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already been recognized as a natural product of a human system.
Whereas, if the same composition has been derived and disclosed in a
non-human invention, that fact only counts against the obviousness
factor, leaving novelty untouched. Application of the novelty
requirement to gene fragment patents is a prime example of the
impotence of the standard as applied in biomedicine. Even under
Chakrabarty, genes in their natural environment and form are not
patentable, but under the current policy, novelty will adhere if the
gene is purified and isolated. Genes are considered not to be in their
original context when they are isolated. The reality of genetics
research is that a gene cannot be efficiently studied unless it is in
isolation. An analogy using a multi-cellular organism further shows
the flaw in this logic and why the "human-intervention" argument
does not really support biomedical patenting. Simply removing a frog
from a pond does not make it novel, thus isolating a gene alone or
introducing a gene into another species alone is not really novel
either. If it were so, novelty in patent law is a tautology and is an
ineffective standard to advance the values of science or creativity.
Yet, this illogical situation persists.
5. Disclosure Conflicts Between Science and Politics
Human embryonic material has caused heated discourse. Human
embryonic tissue research also serves as an example of how the patent
laws fall short of fostering biomedical innovation. The public
concern over the use of certain subject matter for experimentation has
in some ways also been raised to block biomedical patenting by
standing as an obstacle to effective disclosure.62  For example,
disclosure and best mode expression in 35 USC § 112 require patent
claims to be stated in such a way to permit one skilled in the field to
make and use the most efficient version of this invention. 6  Public
opinion on the use of human embryonic material, however, may have
prevented applicants from properly disclosing a biomedical invention
because the researcher was afraid of the public outcry or affect on a
corporation's stock price.
Despite recent legislation embracing limited use of embryonic
tissue and growing public support, these failures remain an issue
today. The Bush plan forces researchers to kowtow to potentially
improperly disclosed patents that were issued before the current
62. See Shirley J. Wright, Human Embryonic Stem-Cell Research: Science and Ethics, 87
AM. SCIENTIST 352 (1999).
63. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2002).
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Administration appeared on the scene. If they do not bow to these
market czars, the only option for competing researchers is to abandon
their stem cell research entirely. The Bush plan permits those
organizations currently holding stem cell patents to continue
enforcing them, irrespective of whether those patents properly
disclose the scope and means by which those inventions were
achieved.
Title 35 does not adequately provide effective management of
biomedical patenting. None of the requirements that have framed
domestic patent regimes in eras since the formation of the country
retain their control and incentive-based system in the context of
biomedical patents. The Patent Code (Code) contains no passages
explicitly addressing the patentability of human or human-derived
materials. Examining for utility now appears to be little more than
taking the applicant's word for the invention's commercial
applicability. 64
B. Questionable Incentives and Policy Results
Socially compromising conditions are likely to result from
permitting the patenting of biomedical materials, including human
tissue and cell derivations. One problem is the commodification of
human cellular material, leading to at least two impermissible results:
1) treading overly close to regulations on the sale of human tissue6
5
and 2) bio-piracy (taking of genetic material without a subject's
knowledge). Scientists and patent attorneys agree, however, that the
patent system is not the correct forum for making ethical decisions.66
Nevertheless, attention should focus on the realistic outcomes of
certain patent practices so Congress may see where it is appropriate to
legislate and how it should act to ameliorate any potential threats to
the dignity and autonomy of humans.
64. Andrew Knight, Pregnant with Ambiguity: Credibility and the PTO Utility Guidelines
in Light ofBrenner, 73 IND. L.J. 997, 1010 (1998).
65. See, e.g., UNIF. ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT § 1 (2), 8A U.L.A. 7 (Supp. 1990). The
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act impacts how fetal and adult human tissues may be acquired for
research.
66. See Margaret Graham Tebo, The Big Gene Profit Machine, A.B.A. JOURNAL, Apr.
2001, at 46-48, col. 2. John Kilyk Jr., who represents the National Institutes of Health as
outside counsel, states that "[p]atent laws are not designed to address ethical, medical or privacy
issues ... patents are intended to allow scientists to share information without fear that their
ideas will be misappropriated." Id.
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1. Raiding Indigenous People's Gene Pools
The most insidious ramification of permitting biomedical utility
patenting is the commodification of human genes. Isolated
indigenous groups are often targets of genetic research due to the
purity of their gene pools. 67 As the products of a limited gene pool
and relatively stable environmental conditions, these groups allow
researchers to study immune system and systemic disease patterns
and to more readily identify how and when diseases may be treated.
Though not all groups resist the use of their genetic material in this
way, patenting and conceptual ownership of these materials are
generally antithetical to most indigenous belief systems.6  Such
opposition has not stopped some researchers from obtaining and
seeking patents on cellular matter derived from these peoples.
In the early 1990's, tissue from a woman of the indigenous
Guaymai tribe of Panama became the basis of a cell line patent.69 The
U.S. Department of Commerce claimed in a patent application that
the cell line potentially had great anti-viral applications.70  The
Guaymai people knew nothing of the development of the cell line,
patent claim, or the initial acquisition of the cellular sample. Rural
Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), 71 a group focused on
67. See Kara H. Ching, Note: Indigenous Self-Determination in an Age of Genetic
Patenting. Recognizing an Emerging Human Rights Norm, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 687, at 687-
88 (1997).
68. See id at 697-98.
69. See Philip L. Bereano, Patent Pending: The Race to Own DNA, SEATTLE TIMES,
Aug. 27, 1995, at B5.
70. Id.
71. Rural Advancement Foundation International ("RAFI"), currently known as the ETC
group, is an Ottawa-based international non-governmental organization "dedicated to the
conservation and sustainable improvement of agricultural biodiversity, and to the socially
responsible development of technologies useful to rural societies." The Rural Advancement
Foundation International at http://www.rafi.org/ (last visited Apr. 12, 2002). RAFI's Research
Director, Hope Shand, has argued that "no matter how well intentioned" the Diversity Project, it
should not proceed until there are adequate safeguards in place.
Indigenous peoples have objected strenuously to the Diversity Project, a U.S. federal
government initiative to investigate and map the genome of indigenous groups around the globe.
The project has led to many patents for cell lines derived from indigenous persons/groups.
Several indigenous representatives have called on the international community for an end to the
Diversity Project. See Discrimination Against Indigenous Peoples: Report of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations on its Fourteenth Session, COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS,
SUB-COMMISSION ON PREVENTION OF DISCRIMINATION AND PROTECTION OF MINORITIES, 48th
Sess., Agenda Item 14, at 27-28, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1996/21 (Aug. 16, 1996). See also
Beijing Declaration of Indigenous Women, NGO Forum, United Nations Fourth World
Conference on Women, Huairou, Beijing, Peoples Republic of China, Aug. 30-Sept. 8, 1995.
A group of indigenous peoples from the western hemisphere also declared that they
"particularly oppose the Human Genome Diversity Project which intends to collect, and make
BIOMEDICAL PA TENTING: PERMISSIBLE?
looking out for indigenous people, has recently taken up the causes of
those people who have not been fairly compensated for their
contributions to scientific research. RAFI notified the Guaymai of the
situation and supported them in their political and documentary
demand for the withdrawal of the patent application.72 The tribe
believes that "it's fundamentally immoral, contrary to the Guaymai
view of nature, and our place in it ... [t]o patent human material...
it violates the integrity of life itself, and our deepest sense of
morality." 73  This address and various other international pressures,
led the Center of Disease Control (on whose behalf the Commerce
Department had filed the patent) to ultimately withdraw the patent
application.
74
The looseness of current international controls on obtaining
human tissue for patenting is exemplified by another situation that
arose in the Solomon Islands. Again, the islanders became the
unknowing donees of genetic material, which was later implemented
as the cell line claimed in an U.S. patent application. 75  Their
government, through their United Nations ambassador, protested to
the U.S. Department of Commerce.76 Ron Brown, the Secretary of
the U.S. Department of Commerce at the time, responded: "Under our
laws, as well as those of many other countries, subject matter related
to human cells is patentable and there is no provision for
considerations relating to the source of the cells that may be the
subject of a patent application., 77
A blind eye to biodiversity prospecting (biopiracy)78 cannot
really be in the interest of legitimizing the patenting of biomedical
available our genetic materials which may be used for commercial, scientific and military
purposes." Declaration of Indigenous Peoples of the Western Hemisphere Regarding the Human
Genome Diversity Project, Phoenix, Arizona, Feb. 19, 1995. The Canada-based World Council
of Indigenous People stated that they "categorically reject and condemn the Human Genome
Diversity Project." Charles J. Hanley, Indigenous Peoples Resist Worldwide Gene Study, L.A.
TIMES, July 7, 1996, at A8.




76. Letter from Ambassador Rex Horoi to the U.S. Dep't of Commerce (Feb. 1, 1994),
available at http://www.rafi.org/pp/hotobr.html (last visited date); see also Bereano, supra note
69, at B5.
77. Letter from former U.S. Department of Commerce Secretary Ron Brown to Solomon
Islands United Nations Ambassador Rex Horoi (Mar. 3, 1994), available at
http://www.rafi.org/pp/brtoho.btml (last visited date); see also Bereano, supra note 69, at B5.
78. See David Robie, Biotechnology-South Pacific: Tribe Caught in Blood Tug-of-War,
INTER PRESS SERVICE, Oct. 25, 1995, available at 1995 WL 10135200.
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materials, for it overlooks the greater effects of the policy on
fundamental human rights. People are protected in this country under
the 13th and 14th amendments 79 from nonconsensual (and in some
forms consensual) commodification, which presumably includes
genetic mining. Likewise, persons amenable to the jurisdiction of the
United Stated must abide by the laws of this nation. Persons seeking
the protections of the US legal system in the form of a patent, may not
subjugate persons of another nation and reasonably expect to profit in
this nation, not in light of the 1 3th and 14 th amendments. Persons of
other nations are also protected from such biological
commodification, in theory, under international laws and human
rights treaties to which the U.S. is a signatory.
80
These laws and treaties are rendered ineffective because our
patent system protects property right claims to materials derived
without consent from foreign nationals in a foreign setting. The
United States' modem administrative state creates a schism of
culpability, such that no one agency may be held responsible for
ameliorating these potential violations of human autonomy.
However, by not permitting the patenting of human biomedical
material, the PTO could procure a remedial effect, without violating
separation of power demarcations that would embrace international
policies and decrease the occurrence of these international incidents.
2. Promotion for Only the Financially-Well-To-Do
Permitting exclusivity of property right to genetic material erects
a penumbra of impermissible obstacles to public health. Patients
requiring treatments derived from biomedical patents may have to pay
a heavier financial cost. An "inventor" of a cell line or strain of
genetic material may prevent others from similarly isolating and
implementing an expression of that gene. In some cases, it may also
protect the result of applying those materials, for U.S. patent law
protects against not only the identical invention or means, but also
those "equivalent," and those that produce the same result. As
biomedicine advances, private economic monopolies threaten to
hinder effective progress.
In the alternative, patentees may authorize the use of their
claimed materials only at an exorbitant cost, thus narrowing the
79. See U.S. CONST. amend. XII1, § 1; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
80. E.g., Art. 15(1), United Nations Conference in Environment and Development:
Convention on Biological Diversity, 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992); Henry T. Greely, The Control of
Genetic Research: Involving the "Groups Between," 33 HOUS. L. REV. 1397, 1415 (1997).
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number of patients who can receive the treatment to those who are
sufficiently wealthy.1 Many experts in biotech law recognize that
proprietary control of publicly funded research imposes significant
costs on other research and administration of healthcare, thereby
obstructing, rather than promoting, beneficial development.82
Certain federal policies, like the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980,83
provide the federal government claim to "march-in" on the rights of
patentees who develop treatments using public money.84 No attempts
to use these provisions, which permit compulsory licensing to the
government when "exceptional" healthcare concerns arise,8 5 have
been successful however in curbing the costs to private patients. The
government has yet to attempt to flex this provision, choosing to err
on the side of favoring a potentially economy-supporting industry,
rather than risking a political backlash from large corporate
financiers.
Permitting utility patents on essential healthcare components
interferes with the administration of healthcare. This was recognized
86in the 1990s, when physicians attempted to patent surgical practices.
Congress responded by creating an exception that stated that the use
of a patented surgical procedure to provide direct medical care did not
infringe a patentee's bundle of rights.8 7 Advocates of controlled
biomedical patenting, which include Lori Andrews of the Chicago-
Kent College of Law and biotech expert Jeremy Rifkin, contend that
direct medical care exceptions should become part of biomedical
patenting.
88
81. See New Drugs: The Right Remedy, WASH. POST, July 7, 2001, at A21; Riley &
Hesman, Advances in Medical Science Aren't Reaching All Who Need Them - Medicine of the
Future, ST. Louis POST-DISPATCH, Jan. 1, 2002, at B 1.
82. See Eisenberg & Nelson, Public vs. Proprietary Science; A Fruitful Tension?, 131
DAEDALUS 89 (2002).
83. Amendment to Patent and Trademark Laws, Bayh-Dole Act, 96 Pub. L. No. 517, 94
Stat. 3015 (1980), 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 200-212 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
84. See generally Evan P. Schultz, Opinion and Commentary, Promoting the Progress of
Science?, 165 N.J.L.J. 1003 (2001).
85. 35 U.S.C.S. §§ 200-212 (Law. Co-op. 2000).
86. Tebo, supra note 66, at 50, col. 1.
87. Id.
88. Id. Andrews states, in reference to the exceptions recognized for the use of patented
surgical procedures, "[a]bsent similar intervention by Congress [providing exceptions to
biomedical patents], the impact on health care could be devastating." [sic] Id. Cf LORI
ANDREWS, FUTURE PERFECT: CONFRONTING DECISIONS ABOUT GENETICS (2001), and JEREMY
RIFKIN, THE BIOTECH CENTURY, HARNESSING THE GENE AND REMAKING THE WORLD (1999).
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IV. REASONABLE REMEDIATIONS
Merely criticizing the patent system does not guide an intelligent
evolution of its standards. For this reason, we should look for
reasonable boundaries that are likely to create greater predictability in
biomedical patenting without risking human and patients' rights.
Some guidance can be garnered from looking abroad.
A. Recognized Limits Set Abroad
Article 53(a) of the European Union Patent Convention (EPC)
states that no invention shall be patentable if "[its] publication or
exploitation would be contrary to odre public (or morality), provided
that the exploitation shall not be deemed to be so contrary merely
because it is prohibited by law or regulation in some or all the
Contracting States."8 9 The same standard is available for a non-party
to oppose an application,9" revoke a grant that may have been
approved, 91 or be subject to limited reservation conditions that a
Contracting State may seek to assert. 92 Odre public is not a concept
expressed in U.S. patent law since the morality component of the
utility requirement fell out of favor. Nevertheless, with the increasing
frequency of biopiracy, the ineffectiveness of international regulations
to control genetic colonialism, and the particularly sensitive nature of
biomedical research, perhaps some room for odre public
determinations is warranted.
The enforcement of odre public prohibitions on patenting with
respect to biotech patents is expressed in Rule 23 of Implementing
Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents.
93
Rule 23 (d) encapsulates the policy that under Art. 53 (a), "no patent
shall be granted for any biotech invention concerning (a) processes
for cloning human beings; (b) processes for modifying the germ line
genetic identity of humans; or (c) uses of human embryos for
industrial or commercial purposes. ' 94 The EPC steps back from this
line, however, in the specific context of the human body and its
89. Art. 53(a), European Patent Convention, Oct. 5, 1973, [hereinafter EPC], European
Patent Office, available at http://www3.european-patent-office.org/legal/epc/e/ar53.html
90. Id. at Art. 100.
91. Id. at Art. 138.
92. Id. at Art. 167(2).
93. Implementing Regulations to the Convention on the Grant of European Patents of
October 5, 1973 [hereinafter IRC], as last amended by Decision of the Administrative Council
of the European Patent Organization of October 13, 1999, European Patent Office (10th ed. Jan.
2000).
94. See id. at R. 23(d).
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elements in Rule 23 (e). This rule states that simple discovery of an
element present in the human body may not be patented, but an
element isolated from the body or produced in a technical process
may be patented, contingent upon adequate industrial application and
disclosure in the patent application. 95
Germ line engineering and human-animal chimera
experimentation is not sanctioned in any manner under the EPC or its
implementation rules.96 Strict adherence to this route may have
deleterious effects on U.S research considering that many biotech
patents, including most stem cell patents, cover cell lines derived
through procedures using animal experimentation. As a result, the
U.S. should tailor an approach that considers the problems raised
from the European perspective and the needs of the U.S. research
community.
B. Updating Domestic Concepts of Patentability, Producing
Reasonable Predictability
One concern of utility patenting in biomedicine is that the results
of experiments with living things have not created anything that was
not fundamentally there before. Oscillating between the poles of
"natural phenomenon" exclusions and "anything under the sun"
grants, arbitrary line drawing essentially halts patent law, fostering no
intelligent resolution. Modernization of the Patent Code is required to
adequately channel the growth of biomedical patenting without
unduly burdening the system or creative incentives. These changes
can be achieved by modifying language in the current incarnations of
the Code.
1. Updating the Patentability Requirements
Prior to the expiration of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission's (NBAC) charter under the Bush Administration,
progress between law, science, and ethics was advancing toward an
accepted evolution in biotechnology. 97  Though the process was
substantially sidelined by other national concerns as 2002 began, the
time has come to once more take up the standard. With further
95. See id. at R. 23(e).
96. EPC, supra note 89, at Art. 53(b).
97. See Exec. Order No. 12,975, 3 C.F.R. 409, § 3 (1996) (creating the Commission); see
also Cloning Human Beings: Report and Recommendations of the National Bioethics Advisory
Commission, 38 JURIMETRICS J. 3 (1997); see also Wright supra note 62.
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advances in biomedicine, a clearer definition of what is. patentable is
required.
A principle matter is to clarify whether under § 101 manipulation
of cell colonies and other biomedical objects employing human
genetic material are patentable or not. Despite case law suggesting
that they are, clarity is required in light of the overwhelming
healthcare component of this technology. Chakrabarty and Allen are
merely the hooks upon which to hang a human material patentability
claim, but if such claims are to sustain the scrutiny in the next
Supreme Court decision, the basis for such patents must be firmer
than the dicta-based vagaries about "anything under the sun."
98
2. Reassessing Utility in the Modem Era
The utility requirement in § 103 also needs to be amended to
specify whether commercial use alone is sufficient and who is to
make that determination.99 The Clinton Administration proposed the
much-needed enhancement to this section of the Code in 1995,00 but
more is needed as biomedical advances. In particular, the required
showing of utility could reasonably be set higher when applied to
human genetic materials. Concurrent with the 1995 amendments to
the examiner guidelines, the Federal Circuit rejected a proposal from
the PTO that "human testing" be required to prove utility in
biotechnology inventions.10 Nevertheless, leaving the bar at the
standard level as applied places a higher burden of proof on the party
seeking to disprove utility. This effective presumption in favor of
utility however, is detrimental in the sphere of biomedicine. It does
not sufficiently challenge the researcher to show more than
speculative projections on the practical application for a substance.
Examiners should have the weight in their favor, at least in respect to
biomedical patents, considering the potential health benefits.
98. See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980).
99. See Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519 (1966) for the proposition that a demonstrable
application is necessary to achieve patent protection. "Unless and until a process is refined and
developed to [the point of substantial utility] - where specific benefit exists in a currently
available form - there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant to engross a broad
field." Id. at 534-35. It's not so much that commercial applicability be found, but that quidpro
quo is found for society. The invention must function as described and be useful as claimed, in
exchange for the protection of the law against others making, selling, or using the invention. See
DONALD S. CHISUM ET AL., PRINCIPLES OF PATENT LAW 707 (2d ed. 2001). "'Practical utility'
is a shorthand way of attributing 'real-world' value to claimed subject matter." (Judge Giles S.
Rich) Nelson v. Bowler, 626 F.2d 853, 856 (C.C.P.A. 1980).
100. See Utility Guidelines, supra note 45.
101. Id.
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3. Propriety of Incentive for Commercial Gain in
Healthcare
On a more macro level, patent law may not be the appropriate
forum to question biomedical inventions and commercial monopolies
in healthcare. Patent law was never intended to be the platform for
social reform; it has limited influence and social restraint. Ultimately,
patents only encourage innovation in so far as they create limits on
how inventions may be used by others.'0 2 This control value might
have been appropriate for earlier patents like cotton gins10 3 and three-
bladed razors,' 0 4 but restraints on distribution in biomedicine and
healthcare may be counterproductive given the vague notice of the
claimed invention in many biomedical patents. 1
05
In conjunction with legislation and policies like Bush's August
2001 stem cell announcement, biomedical patenting effectively
thwarts progress in the field by enabling a small pool of entities to
potentially choke off competing research using common human
materials (owned by no one). The end result is the unavailability of
therapies that actually are or would be helpful in treating genetic or
cellular disorders and a plethora of speculative claims that block real
successes. In light of federal government involvement in research
funding and the use of public research facilities in much of this
research, it seems appropriate for the U.S. government to retain some
control over permissive grants of economic monopolies within its
borders. And in the realm of common cellular progenitors and
substances occurring in every person on earth, the government should
consider whether any private monopoly is appropriate at all. This
may take a form similar to the surgical procedures exceptions, or it
may require a more progressive measure like limiting biomedical
patents to processes only and invalidating any utility patent without
real proof of successful application.
102. See Shultz, supra note 84.
103. See U.S. Patent Nos. 1,460,228 and 6,108,872.
104. See U.S. Patent Nos. 1,423,414 and 6,276,062.
105. See, e.g., U.S. Patent Nos. 4,714,680 (issued Dec. 22, 1987); 4,965,204 (issued Oct.
23, 1990); and 5,130,144 (issued July 14, 1992). These are some of the Civin patents, which are
among the most litigated of all stem cell patents for their use of claim terms like "substantially
free," rather than providing ranges.
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V. POLITICS AND BIOTECHNOLOGY AT PLAY IN THE CURRENT
ADMINISTRATION
Politics has frequently played a part in shaping the Patent Code
and its forces are again influencing the stem cell issue. Imperfect
political schemes render even the most well designed patent rules
ineffective at creating their objectives and result in impractical
frustrations.
A. Specific Frustrations in the Context of the Bush Plan
Proponents of the Bush plan assert that many research avenues
remain open despite the plan's overt restraints. Stem cells may still
be utilized for research as long as they are derived from sources other
than embryos. This includes those taken from adult cells, umbilical
cord blood, and human placentas. However, such prospects permit
only limited potential. A close examination of the Bush plan reveals
the true shortcomings of the policy, especially in its intersection with
biomedical patents.
1. Confirmation of True Cell Line Numbers and Qualities
Most scientists agree, depending upon a qualification of the
number of the "known cell lines" the president relies upon, the sixty-
some embraced cell lines are likely to satisfy the needs of the
upcoming major experimentation cycle (until 2005).106 Interwoven in
this condition are two key sub-issues. Namely, 1) the identities of all
those owning the lines must be made known and 2) even if the
sources are known, the qualities of these cell lines must be identified.
Potentially, many lines may be duplicates of others or too specialized
to be useful for the diverse research purposes.
To this end, many of the cell lines will have to be replaced due to
natural degeneration and spontaneous differentiation (unintentional,
uncontrolled changes into other cell types). Many were grown in
laboratories using mouse or other non-human animal cells, making
them categorically unsuitable for immediate implementation in
human therapies. 0 7 Replication of other stem cells has been achieved
through the introduction of cancer genes, invariably contaminating
their products.0' These conditions suggest a high potential for
106. Vicki Brower, As Stem Cell Controversy Rages, Experts Sobered By State of Art,
BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWSWATCH, July 16, 2001, at 5.
107. See Stem Cell Research: May Be Hindered By Mouse Cells [hereinafter Mouse Cells],
AM. HEALTH LINE, Aug. 24, 2001.
108. See generally Scientists Isolate, Expand Human Brain Stem Cells, MED. INDUSTRY
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introducing animal viruses and cancer vectors into humans if these
stem cells are used for human therapies, creating new and undesirable
health results.
The Federal Drug Administration (FDA) has already realized
this problem. FDA standards for treatments derived using animal
tissue are not impossibly strict and treatments produced in this
manner have recently been approved.'0 9 Nevertheless, the higher
danger of cellular and genetic complication inherent in stem cell
therapies and the potential for animal viral contamination in the
approved cell lines presents a practical hurdle that may render Bush's
pronouncement impracticable.' ° The Bush Administration carved
out a plan to control future research with human embryonic tissue, but
the cell lines considered in that plan may be unsuitable for developing
therapies or advancing the science; no investigation was done on the
viability of the protected cell lines prior to the announcement. The
possibility exists, that unproductive cell lines that have been included
in the Bush plan will block future, beneficial lines.
2. Private Economic Incentives and Research Collaboration
Other factors are private monopolies created through patents on
cellular material and the processes of cultivating stem cells. Even if
the cell line numbers are adequate and the quality good enough, only
a handful of research foundations hold the patents and the rights to
TODAY, January 24, 2000. Researchers at StemCells, Inc. (Palo Alto, CA) purified human brain
stem cells from brain tissue and expanded the number of cells in defined cultures. This
capability, they believe, could lead to treatments for neurological and neurodegenerative
diseases such as Parkinson's and Alzheimer's. Lead researcher Nobuko Uchida asserts "The
ability to isolate and culture normal human brain stem cells is a breakthrough that could open
the way to utilizing these cells to replace or repair diseased or damaged tissue in a patient with
neurological or neurodegenerative disorders." Id.
109. See generally Mouse Cells, supra note 107. Once stem cells are extracted from
human embryos, they are placed with embryonic mouse "feeder" cells, which "excrete some
unknown nutrient or growth factor that helps the human cells stay healthy." Under FDA
regulations, the cells would be considered "xenotransplants." Transplants containing animal
tissue would be subject to greater scrutiny. Those developing stem cell-based therapies would
have to conduct more research and document all of their efforts to prove that the therapies do
not carry the risk of transferring an animal virus to humans. Further, under the FDA rules, some
groups of patients would not be eligible to take part in stem cell trials. Id.
110. Id. If none of the approved stem cell lines were developed without the aid of animal
cells, it could "be a real killer" for stem cell research, states researcher George Daley, of the
Whitehead Institute for Biomedical Research. Daley adds that he does not think any of the 60
lines are free of animal tissue. According to Kevin Ryder, a consultant to the American Cell
Therapy Research Foundation, "This would be the exclamation point" on scientists' list of
questions and reservations about the Bush policy. "We would have a very difficult time getting
[stem cell therapies] advanced into the clinical setting unless we get the FDA to make some
exceptions down the road," he added. Id.
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commercially use these cells lines. Consequently, the process for
publicly funded scientists to acquire licenses to these cell lines are
likely to be slow and laborious, accompanied by excessive use
restrictions."' Some domestic companies, holding patented cell lines,
are not willing to share them with other researchers." 2  The
proclamation made by the President threatens to change the finely
wrought system of biomedical and pharmaceutical research in this
nation by severing the prior balance of cooperation within the
research community and creating unprecedented value in patents
issued before the announcement.
B. Domestic Research and Pharmaceutical Development
The research cycle for biomedicine follows a fairly consistent
formula." 3  Large, publicly funded universities maintain research
facilities that work with private organizations. The private groups
provide money and expertise in exchange for university assistance in
performing broad-ranging basic research. The private companies take
a small piece of the knowledge and any media achieved through this
research, from which they perform the next level of focused research
themselves. This formula enables private organizations to get
necessary information more quickly, resulting in less research cost to
recoup when a drug or procedure reaches the market than if these
organizations were to conduct all research from the basic level up to
the final product.
Inherent in this design is that general knowledge is shared more
willingly and built upon more rapidly than if all research were done
behind private doors. However, privately funded research will still be
permitted and may be kept secret (even if it runs contrary to the recent
stance of the President), as long as that research is conducted without
the use of publicly funded material, equipment, or facilities. As a
consequence, several private research institutions have already
provided funds for the creation of separate facilities at public
111. See generally Eisenberg & Nelson, supra note 82. The example of the human genome
project is used to explain the interplay between public and private research, and then the
public's access to later-patented inventions that were born of publicly funded research.
112. See Catherine Arnst, Commentary, Stem Cell Science Needs More from Uncle Sam,
Bus. WK., Sept. 10, 2001, at 88, col. 2. Already, two private companies that developed some of
the 64 stem cell lines approved by the NIH (CyThera Inc. of San Diego and Reliance Life
Sciences PVT of Bombay) have said they are not willing to make the lines generally available
now. Id.
113. See Carl E. Pray, Public-Private Sector Linkages in Research and Development:
Biotechnology and the Seed Industry in Brazil, China and India, 83 AM. J. AGRIC. ECON. 742
(2001).
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universities and to supplement the salaries of public researchers in
order to keep results private and avoid federal government controls.
The changes proposed by the current administration are likely to
alter domestic biomedical research by indirectly encouraging more
private research. Redundancies and replication of research may
increase which results in greater cost shouldered by patients or could
lead to the demise of unprofitable biotechnology companies.
VI. DEVELOPMENT BALANCE AND THE GLOBAL PACE OF PROGRESS
The Bush Administration's proposal could result in a
monopolization of the knowledge in cell therapy to private
researchers or to a small pool of biomedical patentees. This has
significant disadvantages for the public and competitors that advocate
regenerative cell therapy, as well as moral objectors to reproductive
rights. One major drawback is that public scrutiny in the form of
citizens petitioning themselves or through their elected officials will
no longer keep private research in check.
A. Public Scrutiny of Domestic Research
When public universities conduct basic research for private
firms, public scrutiny of that research significantly reigns in work
bordering on the socially unconscionable. The Bush Administration
controls Executive Branch research funding, restricting the basic
research now permitted at public institutions, resulting in a less aware
public. Private research, left untouched by the pronouncement, will
become truly secret and unsupervised.' 14  More socially
unconscionable research-related activities are likely to continue
behind closed doors, now that the economic incentive to abide by the
rules of social mores has been removed.
1 15
Economics plays a powerful role in the ultimate cost of
treatments derived from private research as well. Cell therapies
produced entirely through private funding are likely to follow the
example of privately developed drugs like Gleevec. The cancer drug,
114. See generally Franklin L. Best, Jr., Transfers of Bodies and Body Parts Under the
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 15 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 806, 821 (1980). Cf Murray, On
the Human Body as Property: The Meaning of Embodiment, Markets and the Meaning of
Strangers, 20 J. L. REFORM 1055, 1074 (1987). "We do not view all trade in body parts with the
same seriousness, e.g., hair nail clippings, plasma and semen... It is clear some markets in body
products are to be tolerated." Id.
115. See Margaret Engel, Va. Doctor Plans Company to Arrange Sale of Human Kidneys,
WASH. POST, Sept. 19, 1983, at A9, col. 1. The growing demand for human body parts did in
fact prompt a Virginia doctor, H. Barry Jacobs, to establish a company to broker human kidneys.
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developed entirely in-house by Novaris over a ten-year period, is
available on the market at a price of nearly $2,500 per month.116 If
the private sector alone is asked to shoulder the cost of basic research
and high patent licensing fees, they will need to make a profit in order
to finance future research.
B. Domestic Competition and Information Exchanges
Pulling the rug out from under the domestic research structure of
the United States by limiting federal funding of promising research
sets off economic factors that may even prevent cell therapies from
reaching consumers at all. Various research laboratories and
corporations threaten to stop research in the wake of the President's
announcement.
1. Patent Restraints
Most domestic biotechnology firms are too small to lead the
charge alone in the advancement of cell therapy. In the face of
increasing federal intervention in laboratories, firms are looking for
ways to at least hold their positions. The federal government provides
just such protection through the several patents already granted on
compositions of embryonic cell lines and methods of isolating stem
cells. 117 These domestic patents are held closely by a small pool of
research organizations. Among those with the most wide-reaching
patents are the University of Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(WARF) and Geron Pharmaceuticals Corp. (Geron).
WARF and Geron, who funded much of the research, hold U.S.
Patent Nos. 5,843,780 and 6,200,806 ('780 and '806 patents
respectively). The '780 patent protects "a purified preparation of
primate embryonic stem cells" capable of proliferation in vitro, as
well as a method of isolating primate embryonic stem cells. 1 8 The
'780 patent may be read to include the use and derivation of homo
sapiens stem cells as related to primates. The breadth of potential
interpretations of the '806 patent claims makes it one of the most
controversial of all cell line patents. It claims "a purified preparation
of pluripotent human embryonic stem cells capable of proliferation in
vitro for more than one year... that maintain a karyotype that will not
116. Arnst, supra note 112, at col. 3.
117. Alica A. Russo, Robert C. Scheinfeld & Parker H. Bagley, The Current State of
Embryonic Stem Cell Patents, (Sept. 26, 2001) (written for Baker Botts LLP) available at
http://www.bakerbotts.com/news/ (on file with author).
118. Id.
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alter through prolonged culture, nor differentiate on a cultured
fibroblast feeder layer."
'' 19
Interpretations of the '806 patent suggest that any method of
deriving a stem cell line will infringe the patent 12 including processes
now known and foreseeable. The breadth of the '806 patent may
render domestic attempts to design competitive cell lines nearly
impossible. Even inventors utilizing stem cells derived abroad may
still be infringing the '806 patent if their methods are equivalent,'
21
reaching beyond the legal monopoly in the U.S. Constitution. The
control inherent in this patent has thrown WARF and Geron into
heated disputes over who has the right to certain uses.122 Under these
patents, both entities invariably will influence the pace of domestic
advances in the field.
Other notable U.S. patents involved in the future of stem cell line
development include Nos. 5,874,301 and 5,917,268 (held by the
National Jewish Center for Immunology and Respiratory Medicine)
which describe the use of a growth gene (HOX 11) to replicate stem
cells in a culture; and No. 5,453,357 (held by Vanderbilt University)
which describe a composition of hESCs, fibroblast growth factors,
and a leukemia inhibitor factor, used to increase growth and
proliferation of stem cells. 123  CyThera, Inc. and Reliance Live
Sciences P.V.T. Ltd., holders of cell lines that are acceptable under
the Bush pronouncement, have asserted general unwillingness to
make their holdings publicly available. 1
24
2. Collateral Discoveries and Alternative Methods
Collateral discoveries are jeopardized when the financial burden
of research is shifted to the private sector. Large private researchers
119. Id. (emphasis added).
120. See Shultz, supra note 84.
121. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605 (1950). The
doctrine of equivalents is founded on the theory that, if two devices do the same work in
substantially the same way and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same, even
though they differ in name, form or shape. In determining equivalents, consideration must be
given to the purpose for which an ingredient is used in a patent, the qualities it has when
combined with other ingredients, the functions which it is intended to perform, and whether
persons reasonably skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an
ingredient not contained in the patent with one that was. Id. at 608-09. Cf Home Diagnostics,
Inc. v. Lifescan, Inc., No. 01-1428, 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 10909 (Fed. Cir. May 29, 2002) (per
curiam), and Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 122 S. Ct. 1831 (2002).
122. Shultz, supra note 84.
123. Russo, Scheinfeld & Bagley, supra note 117.
124. See Brower, supra note 106.
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with adequate funding are unlikely to expend resources when their
results may be banned from the market or found infringing. In their
place, small researchers take up the gauntlet, but they are limited in
scope as they do so. 125  For example, if they are interested in
regenerating heart tissue, they are less likely to look into pancreatic
cells. This holds back the entire field, since ventures leading to
discoveries potentially benefiting other researchers may not be
funded. Similarly, the extension of resources will follow the money
supporting the organizations. Venture capital generally flows into
endeavors with clear potential for results. Risky research for curing
rare diseases or discovering new procedures not likely to generate a
return on investment within reasonable time frame will most likely
not be conducted. 126 Such ventures may channel all resources toward
major diseases and conditions, leaving collateral conditions and those
suffering under them ignored.
C. International Competition
A major issue for domestic researchers is that under the Bush
guidelines, international firms will take the lead in stem cell
technology. At the time of the August 2001 pronouncement, 48 of the
60-some embraced cell lines resided in laboratories outside of the
United States. 127 For example, public support of work with these cell
lines has led to advances in embryology, fertility treatments, and the
creation of an hESC bank in Great Britain, the home of the first test-
tube baby and the first mammal cloned from an adult.' 
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Britain is also aggressively striving to extend its lead by
recruiting researchers worldwide. The Medical Research Council
(MRC) in London recently announced a program to attract the
brightest minds in stem cell research by offering two-year grants of
over $2 million. MRC currently funds the clinical science center at
London's Imperial College School of Medicine and Roger Pederson's
laboratory in Cambridge. Pederson left the University of California at
San Francisco because he felt federal stem cell policies threatened the
scope of his research. 129 The decisions of Pederson and others to
125. See Russo, Scheinfeld & Bagley, supra note 117; see also Kerry Capell, Catherine
Arnst & Arlene Weintraub, At Risk: A Golden Opportunity in Biotech, Bus. WK., Sept. 10,
2001, at 85-86.
126. See generally Capell, Arnst & Weintraub, supra note 125, at 86.
127. Id. at 85.
128. Id. at 86.
129. Id.
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conduct research abroad suggest the imminence of a "brain-drain" of
top domestic biomedical talent in the U.S.
Even if researchers are not lured away by overseas enterprises,
multi-national pharmaceutical and research companies may move
important work abroad. In 1999, Geron bought the Roslin Institute,'3"
a spin-off of Roslin Biomed based in Scotland. A team of Roslin
researchers began working on Geron-funded projects in the fall of
2001. Thomas Okarma, Geron's CEO, also suggested at the
California Cloning Conference 3' that research performed abroad may
stay there if rigid U.S. government control measures suppress the
potential for a domestic market in stem cell therapies. Restrictive
controls on federal funding for stem cell research are likely to trickle
down and restrict private funding and healthcare advances available
to U.S. citizens, despite the presence of such advances abroad.
Disease sufferers may be forced to travel abroad for life-saving
treatments.
VII.CONCLUSION
Permitting biomedical utility patents raises several concerns.
The most fundamental concern comes from the perspective of a
potential consumer, i.e. a patient. The U.S. situation with stem cell
research suggests that such patents are not advisable, since they
frustrate incentives to develop therapies, as well as threaten access to
therapies. Economic incentives to create new inventions touch a
tender spot of the human psyche when private legal monopolies are
permitted to block progressive research. This is especially true when
the blocked research is focused toward a better healthcare, regardless
of wealth.
On a more academic level, there is another problem: the results
of experiments with living things may not create anything that was
not virtually there before. If nothing novel or nonobvious is created,
the patent system is being tarnished by issuance of biomedical
patents. In the sense of a mechanical device, the drive components
did not exist except as metal ore before the "invention," but the ore
had the capability to become these parts. Chemical compositions that
130. Id. The Roslin Institute is best known as the facility where Dolly the sheep was
cloned in 1994. Dolly was the first mammal to be cloned using adult mammalian tissue. Prior to
that time, cloning was well known in the context of plant materials research, where it
proliferated in various forms. Roslin Biomed was formed to conduct work toward the
therapeutic application of stem cells and cloned material for human therapies.
131. Thomas Okarma, CEO, Geron, Address at the California Cloning Conference (Santa
Clara University, California, Oct. 12, 2001).
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achieve certain effects when placed on other materials create
conditions that did not exist before, but no one "invented" those base
chemicals or elements with their unique properties. Permitting utility
patenting of biotech products is analogous to permitting someone to
patent a metal ore pulled from the earth, or a basic element from the
Periodic Table. No one can really claim the right to patent life, for
there was life before the biotechnician came along. Biomedical
patents push life form patenting ever closer toward our concept of
human autonomy. By permitting life form patents for animals and
extracted human cells, we will ultimately be asked whether the law
permits the patenting of a person in some form. The answer certainly
cannot be that such an act is permissible or even wise.
Giving someone credit (let alone any form of monopoly) for
something that she has not rightfully created offends the innate senses
of propriety. The basic element of a cell or tissue sample, and the
foundation upon which its utility is claimed in biomedical patents is
that the material has life. To date, no one has been able to take inert
substances and create life from that which is not alive. No one
therefore can claim creation of a product that was alive to start with
that had inherent properties and capabilities before it was combined
with other items or processes. That is, no one can patent something
that has life already. Essentially, that which is alive is obvious from
the instant it is selected by the researcher, and arguably continues to
be so all the way through to the end product.
Taking the living element out of the biomedical patent has no
utility. If you cannot claim life, what can you claim? Only the
processes by which one channels the pre-existing life within
something may be patented. A process patent in biomedicine does
not elicit the same issues as does a utility patent, and as such is
perhaps the most appropriate avenue for biomedical patenting.
Before a utility patent' 32 may rightfully be granted in this author's
view, the biotechnician must create not only life from which before
there was inanimate material, but something truly unique as well.
Extreme line drawing, however, essentially stifles patent law too
much. Nevertheless, a modernization of the Patent Code is required
to adequately and effectively channel the growth of biomedical
patenting without unduly burdening public health concerns, the patent
132. A utility patent is what most people think of when they imagine a patent on an
invention. It is a patent on a useful item or device, as opposed to a process patent, which claims
a method of producing a result, or a design patent, which claims a particular shape or functional
feature of an item.
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system, or creative incentives. These changes can be achieved by
modifying language in the Code to clarify exact bounds and address
the potential availability of compulsory healthcare licensing in certain
situations.

